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ABSTRACT 
A gambler seeks to maximize his probability of reaching a goal in 
a game where he is allowed at each stage to stake any amount of his current 
fortune. He wins each bet with a certain fixed probability w. Lester E. 
Dubins and Leonard J. Savage found optimal strategies for a gambler who 
knows w. Here strategies are found which are nearly optimal for all w 
and, therefore, also for a gambler with an unknown w. 
1. Introduction. 
In continuous red-and-black gambling problems the gambler can stake 
any amount s of his current fortune f, 0 < s < f. If he stakes s his 
fortune becomes f + s with probability w and f - s with probability 
w = 1 - w where O < w < 1. The gambler is allowed to gamble repeatedly. 
We consider a gambler whose objective is to reach fortune 1, so the utility 
of his strategy is the probability that he attains fortune 1 using that 
strategy. The problem, which has content only for O < f < 1, is to find 
a strategy which makes this probability as large as possible. 
In the more precise notation and terminology of Dubins and Savage (1965), 
red-and-black is,for fixed w, a gambling problem in which the set of 
fortunes, utility of a fortune, and available gambles are as follows: 
F = (0, -f-00); u{f) = 1 or O according as 
(w6{f+s) + w6{f-s}: 0 ~ s ~ f) for all 
the measure which assigns mass 1 to (f). 
f > 1 or O < f < 1; r (f) = 
w 
f e F. The symbol 6(f) denotes 
A strategy cr available at f in rw is a sequence cr0 , cr1 , ••• where 
cr0 e rw(f) and, for each positive n and each finite sequence (f1, ••• , fn) 
of elements of 
is denoted by 
F, cr (f1 , ••• , f) er (f ). The utility of a strategy cr n n w n 
u{cr) and U {f) = sup u{cr) where the supremum is taken over 
w 
all cr available at f in r. A strategy cr is e-optimal at f 
w 
in r 
w 
if u{cr) ~ Uw(f) - e for e ~ 0 and is optimal if it is 0-optimal. 
Specifying a gamble in r {f) is equivalent to specifying a stake, so that 
w 
a strategy can as well be defined in terms of stakes. This definition of 
strategy has the advantage that the same stakes are available at a fortune f 
for every value of w. 
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-I 
-
Consider first the case in which w is fixed with O < w < 1/2. 
Dubins and Savage (1965) show that in these subfair games it is optimal 
to play boldly by always staking min{f, £) for O < f < 1 where f = 1 - f. 
Denote the utility of the bold strategy starting from f by B (f) 
w 
for 
0 < w < 1. Some characteristics of B {f) and a description of other 
-W 
optimal strategies will be given in Section 3. 
Now consider the case in which 1/2 < w < 1. It follows from the 
general theory of proportional strategies in Chapter 10 of Dubins and Savage 
(1965), or from a simple direct argument based on the strong law of large 
numbers, that the strategy which always stakes af at fortune f for 
a> O is optimal for a sufficiently small depending on w, and the 
utility of such strategies is 1. However, none of these proportional 
strategies is simultaneously optimal for all w in{½, l]o 
Here we show that a strategy which always stakes f 2 at f is optimal 
for 1/2 < w < 1. This result serves as an aid in finding a strategy which 
is nearly optimal for values of w less than 1/2 and greater than 1/2 
simultaneously. Roughly, one such strategy is to stake f 2 for f near zero 
and to make nearly bold stakes elsewhereo Such a strategy is also nearly 
optimal when the gambler does not know the value of w but has a probability 
distribution on w. Thus, a gambler can ignore prior information about w without 
significant loss. A gambler cannot always ignore such information without 
loss in discrete red-and-black, a problem we briefly consider in which the goal 
is a positive integer and the fortunes and permitted stakes are also integers. 
2. Timid Play is optimal for ½< w ~ 1. 
The timid stake at f is defined by 
t{f) = f 2 if O ~ f < 1 
= 0 if f > 1. 
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The timid strategy at f in r is that strategy, available at 
w 
which always stakes t{f') whenever f' is the current fortune. 
Theorem 1. 
f in r ,· 
w 
If 1/2 < w < 1 and f > 0, then the timid strategy at f has utility 1 
and is, therefore, optimal. 
Proof: 
Let 1/2 < w < 1. Suppose f > 0, 0 < ct < 1. A gambler who has 
fortune f and stakes ctf will, at the next stage, have a fortune f 1 
which is (1-kt)f with probability w and (1-ct)f with probability w. 
Thus, the expected value of the logarithm of his resultant fortune is 
E log f 1 = g(ct) + log f, 
where g(ct) = w log (l+c:t) + w log (1-ct). Since _g(O) = 0 and g'(O) > O 
there is an ct(w) in (0, 1) such that g(ct) > 0 for O <ct~ c:t(w). 
Therefore; if a gambler has fortune f with O < f ~ ct{w) and makes 
the timid stake at f, then E log f 1 > log f. 
Consider now the sequence of fortunes f, f 1 , f 2 , ••• of a gambler 
who starts with f and plays timidly. Suppose O < f < ct{w) and set 
X = log f, and, for n = 1,2, •• o, 
X = log f if f 1 < ct{w), i = 1, ••• , n, n n 
= log 1< if f 1 < ct{w), i = 1, ••• , k-1 and \ ::: ct{w) for some k ~ n. 
The argument above shows that.the process X, x1 , x2 , ••• is a submartingale. 
Since the process is also bounded above by log {ct{w) + ct{w) 2 ), it converges 
almost surely to a random variable Y such that EY::: X (Theorem VII.4.ls, 
p. 324 in Doob (1953).). But convergence of the X to a finite number n 
less than log ct(w) is clearly impossible and convergence to -oo can only 
occur with probability zero since otherwise EY = -oo. Hence, Y ~ log ct(w) 
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-almost surely. In other words, a timid gambler who reaches a fortune 
less than a(w) will, with probability one, attain a fortune larger than 
a(w) at some future stageo Whenever his current fortune is larger than 
a(w), his fortune will become 1 before becoming less than a(w) after k 
or more plays with probability at least wk, where k is finite and chosen 
so that, starting from O:'(w), k consecutive wins enable a timid gambler 
to reach 1. Since his fortune will be greater than a(w) an unlimited 
number of times with probability 1 it follows that a timid gambler with 
positive initial fortune will eventually reach fortune 1 with probability 1. D 
There are, of course, many other strategies which are optimal for 
all w in (1/2, l]. For example, consider a strategy which stakes 
fl+5 with 6 > 0 whenever the current fortune is f. A trivial modification 
of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that such a strategy is optimal in superfair 
red-and-black. Roughly speaking, any strategy will do which makes stakes 
near zero small enough to ensure that the log f process is expectation 
n 
increasing for f near zero and stakes away from zero large enough 
n 
(but never the entire fortune) to guarantee that the f process does not 
n 
remain forever in (0, 1) with positive probabilityo We have not been able 
to characterize those strategies which are optimal for all w in (1/2, 1], 
at least not in any satisfactory way. 
3. 6-bold strategies are e-optimal for all w. 
Let O < 6 < 1/2 and consider the family of strategies which always 
stake b0(f) at f where 
f2 if 0 < f ~ 6, 
b6(f) f-6 if 6 < f < (1+6)/2, = 
f if (1+0)/2~ f < 1, 
0 if f> 1. 
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The 6-bold strategy at f in rw is that strategy available at f in r 
w 
which stakes b0(f
1 ) whenever. f 1 is the current fortune. Playing 6-boldly 
means playing timidly for f e (0, 6] and boldly for f e (6, 1), but as 
--, though the fortune is f - 6 instead of f. 
-
Theorem 2. 
For every e > 0, there is a 6(e) > O such that for all 6 e (0, 6(e)), 
w e[O, 1], and f e F, the 6-bold strategy is e-optimal at f 
Proof: 
in r. 
w 
If w e {O) U (1/2, l], then 6-bold play is optimal at every f e F 
for all 6 e (o, 1/2). This is clear if w is 0 or 1, so suppose 
1/2 < w < 1. By Theorem 1 a 6-bold gambler whose initial fortune is in {o, 5) 
will attain a fortune at least as large as 6 with probability 1. A 6-bold 
gambler whose initial fortune is in [6, 1) will attain fortune 1 after at 
-k 
most k + 1 plays with probability at least ww, where k is a positive 
integer such that a 6-bold gambler starting from 6 reaches 1 after k 
consecutive wins. Therefore the fortune of a 6-bold gambler reaches 1 
with probability 1 for 1/2 < w < 1. 
Now fix e > 0 and consider we (o, 1/2). For all· f, U (f) = B (f) 
w w 
which is continuous and increasing on [O, l]. Also, Bw{f) < Bw 1{f) 
for w < w' and f e (0, 1). It follows from formula 5.2.1 of Dubins 
._ and Savage (1965) that B (3/4) = w + ww, which tends to Oas w ~ O. 
w 
Choose w0 < 1/2 such that, for OS w S w0 , Bw(3/4) < e. For w S w0 
and f < 3/4, B (f) < e and every strategy is e-optimal at f. For 
- w 
w S w0 and f > 3/4 the 6-bold strategy at f with O < 6 < 1/2 makes 
the same stakes as an optimal strategy {namely, the bold strategy) at fortunes 
greater than 3/4 and continues with an e-optimal strategy if the gambler's 
fortune ever becomes less than 3/4. It follows that, for O < 6 < 1/2 and 
0 < w S w0 , the 6-bold strategies are e-optimal for all f. 
- 5 -
-The case we (w0 , 1/2] remains to be considered. For f e (6, 1), 
the probability that the fortune of a &-bold gambler starting from f 
reaches 1 before 6 is Bw(i:~) and so the utility of the 6-bold strategy 
at f is larger than Bw(f-6). Suppose k and n are nonnegative integers 
with k < 2n and 
Use first the fact that Bw(f) is increasing in f for each w and 
then formula 5.2.2 of Dubins and Savage (1965) to get 
B (f) - B (f-6) < B ((k+1)2-n) - B (k2-n)· = ;;awn-a, 
w w - w w 
where a is the number of l's in the binary expansion of k2-n. It follows 
that 
B {f) - B {f-6) < [max(l-w0 , l/2)]n. w w -
Let n be large enough to guarantee that the right side is less than e 
and let 6(e) = min{e, 2-n). It follows that, for 6 < 6(e), we (w0 , 1/2], 
and f e(6, 1), 6-bold play is e-optimal. 
The conclusion holds trivially for f e (0, 6]. For such an f, 
if 6 < 6(e)· and w < 1/2, then B (f) < B ( 6) < B1 ( 6) = 6 < e. D 
- w - W - 2 
As was the case with the timid strategy in the previous section, the 
&-bold strategies are not uniquely e-optimal for all f and w. The argument 
used to prove Theorem 2 can be modified to show that any family of strategies 
which makes timid or similar stakes near zero, bold stakes near 1, and 
sufficiently close to bold stakes (but never the entire fortune) elsewhere 
has the desired property. For example, a strategy which stakes min{f1+6, f) 
for 6 > 0 whenever the current fortune is f is e-optimal for all w if 
6 is sufficiently small. 
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Another sort of nonuniqueness arises from the fact that bold play 
is not uniquely optimal in subfair red-and-black. Suppose n is a positive 
-n -n integer and k is a nonnegative integer with k2 < f < (k+1)2 • If 
w < 1/2, then according to Dubins and Savage (1965, Section 5.4) an optimal 
strategy at f is to play boldly to scale on the interval (k2-n, (k+1)2-n) 
followed by some optimal continuation after reaching either endpoint. 
Likewise, an e-optimal strategy for all w is to play 6(e/2)-boldly 
to scale on such an interval followed by some continuation which is e/2-
optimal for all w. 
4. Red-and-black w.ith a probability distribution on w. 
Suppose w is not known precisely, but is a random variable whose 
distribution is a probability measure TT on (0, 1]. The outcome of 
each gamble may now affect future stakes for two reasons: the gambler's 
fortune f changes and his information regarding w changes. The object 
is to reach 1 as before. 
Consider the following gambling problem. The set of fortunes is 
G = {(f, TT): f e F, TT e p), where P can be taken to be the collection of 
countably additive probabilities defined on the Borel subsets of [O, l] 
or the collection of finitely additive probabilities defined on all subsets 
of [O, 1]. The gambler's utility for {f, TT) e G is u(f, TT)= u(f) 
which is again O or 1 according as f < 1 or f > 1. For TT e P, 
let ETT = J wdTT{w) and ETT = J wdTT{w} in a slight departure from standard 
notation, and define Tfw' ~ € P by 
'fTw(B) = i J wd11(w} if En + O, 
TT B 
= n(B) if En= o, 
TTL (B) = l J wd,r(w) if Err + O, 
ETT B 
= n(B) if En= o, 
for appropriate sets B. TTw and ~ reflect information present about 
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w after observing a win and loss, respectively. The convention that 
ww = TT when Err= 0 and TTL= TT when ETT = 1 is somewhat arbitrary, 
but of little importance since win and loss, respectively, are events 
of probability zero. To stake s at {f, rr) is to use the gamble 
g(s, f, TT)= (En)o(f+s, fTw) + (Err)6(f-s, ~) and the available gambles 
are defined by r(f, n) = {g(s, f, TT}: O < s Sf). Let U be the utility 
of the house r. That is, U(f, rr) is the supremum over all strategies 
a available at (f, rr) in r of the a-probability that 1 is reached. 
The 6-bold strategy at (f, TT) in r is that strategy available at (f, TT) 
in r which stakes b0{f') whenever the current fortune is (f
1
, n'). 
The next result is a natural consequence of Theorem 2. 
Theorem 3. 
For e > O, there is a 6(e) > 0 such that, for all 6 e (o, 6(e)) 
and all {f, TT) e G, the 6-bold strategy at (f, TT) is e-optimal. Furthermore, 
for all 
Proof: 
(f, TT) e G, U{f, TT)= JU (f)dn(w) = TT(w > 1/2) + J B (f)drr(w). 
W ...,..1 TA 
W:::.2 
For (f, TT) e G, let Q(f, TT)= J Uw(f)dTT(w). Then Q?: u since 
Uw?: u for all w. Also, for O ~ s ~ f, 
g(s, f, TT)Q = (En)Q(f+s, Tfw) + (ETT)Q(f-s, TTi,) 
= J [wuw(f+s) + w uw(f-s)]dTT(w) ~J uw(f)drr(w), 
since Uw is excessive for rw. Therefore, g(s, f, n)Q S Q(f, TT). 
Thus Q is excessive for r and, by Theorem 2.12.1 of Dubins and Savage 
(1965), Q?: U. (A different proof of this is based on the obvious fact 
that the gambler can do at least as well knowing the value of w as he 
can without such knowledge.) 
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-Let e ~ 0 and 6(e) be as in Theorem 2. Suppose O < 6 < 6(e) 
and let cr, cr be the 6-bold strategies available at f, {f, TT) in 
w 
rw' r, respectively. Then U{f, TT) 2: u{cr) = J u{crw)dTT{w)?: f (uw(f)-e)dTT{w) = 
Q(f, rr) - e. D 
It is interesting that the 6-bold gambler does essentially as well 
as he could expect to do while ignoring his distribution TT and the results 
of the gambles. Another e-optimal strategy {at least in the countably 
additive case) is to stake O until the distribution of w assigns 
probability at least 1 - e to the set [O, 1/2) or (1/2, 1] and play 
timidly or boldly thereafter. This strategy is less appealing since it 
seems less likely to be helpful in an analysis of a problem in which there 
is a mininnim positive stake, as is the case in the problem considered next. 
5. Discrete red-and-black. 
Let n be a positive integer, F = {0,1, ••• , n), and O ~ w ~ 1. If 
£ is 0 or n, define r (£) = (6{f)); if 
w 
f = 1,2, ••• , n-1, define 
r (f) = {w6(f+s) + w6{f-s): B = 1, ••• , n-f). Set u{n) = 1 and u{f) = 0 
w 
for f = O, ••• , n-1. This defines a discrete red~and-black gambling problem 
• analogous to the continuous one considered in previous sections; now the 
goal is f = n. For a fixed value of w, optimal strategies are known. 
If O:::: w:::: 1/2, then one optimal strategy is to play boldly by always 
staking the largest available amount; this result is an easy consequence 
of the corresponding one for continuous red-and-black. If 1/2 ~ w ~ 1, 
then the timid strategy which always makes the least possible stake is 
optimal. This is easily proved using Theorem 2.12.1 of Dubins and Savage 
(1965) and the formula for the utility of timid play given in Section XIV.2 
of Feller (1957). If 1/2 < w < 1, timid play is uniquely optimal. 
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Unlike the continuous case, there need not exist strategies which are 
e-optimal for all w. For example, if n = 2m > 2, then the uniquely optimal 
stake at f = m is m for we (0, 1/2) and is 1 for we (1/2, 1). 
{Here an optimal {e-optimal) stake at f is one which is the first stake 
in_some optimal (e-optimal) strategy at f.) Since there are only a finite 
number of available stakes, none of them is e-optimal for all w when e 
is sufficiently small. 
Another feature of the problem which differs from the continuous case 
is that the gambler cannot safely ignore information about w. A striking 
illustration of this is that if n = 8 {chosen as the smallest interesting 
power of 2), it is optimal for any fixed value of w to stake 1 at the 
fortune f = 5 {and uniquely optimal for we (1/2, 1)), but, as computer 
• calculations indicate, 1 is not an optimal stake when w has the prior 
distribution which gives probability 1/2 to each of the values 1/4 and· 
3/4 (3 is the optimal.stake) •. 
The discrete problem with a probability distribution on w can, of 
course, be formulated as a gambling problem by analogy with the continuous 
problem in Section 4. It is possible to get information about this discrete 
problem from the continuous one when n is large, but interesting, exact 
results about optimal strategies seem difficult to obtain. 
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